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Agamben’s Sovereign Legalisation of Foucault 
TOM FROST∗ 
 
Abstract - This article compares Michel Foucault’s way of thinking about 
sovereignty and law within biopower to the reading given to Foucault’s work and 
its development by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. It is argued that 
Agamben supports the expulsion thesis in order to generate critical distance for 
his own re-imagining of biopower. The expulsion thesis is a controversial account 
of the position of law in Foucault’s work that does not reflect Foucault’s own 
nuanced views. A post-structuralist account of Foucault and law is then used to 
show that Agamben’s conception of law is actually much more similar to 
Foucault’s than Agamben at first claimed. The real thrust of Agamben’s work is 
found in his connecting political philosophy to ontology. Agamben’s claim that 
the questioning of law is a fundamental ontological issue calls into question the 
very concept of subjectivity. This leads Agamben to embark upon a radical 
reconceptualisation of sovereignty in relation to the subject and the law. Despite 
opening new areas of inquiry in relation to Being and law, Agamben’s attempt to 
move beyond Foucault’s work is called into question, with particular emphasis 
upon whether Agamben’s work is truly ontological. 
 
I. Introduction 
This article makes three arguments. First, that Giorgio Agamben’s re-reading and 
re-interpretation of Michel Foucault’s hypothesis of biopower involves a 
mischaracterisation of Foucault’s work on Agamben’s part by promulgating a 
version of the expulsion thesis, which states that Foucault excluded the law from 
his formulations of power. This position is necessary for Agamben to generate 
critical distance between his work and Foucault’s own writings on law.  
 Second, post-structuralist readings of Foucault’s account of law, in particular 
those of Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, provide a conception of law 
remarkably similar to Agamben’s, leaving Agamben open to a post-structuralist 
criticism that his work is not as nuanced or historically accurate as Foucault’s.  
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 Thirdly, despite these criticisms Agamben appears to present his work as 
much more ontologically significant than Foucault’s. Agamben’s work radically 
redefines the traditional concept of sovereignty by linking it to the manufacturing 
of subjectivity. This links in with Agamben’s lofty aims to question life itself 
through his work - Agamben argues that Foucault’s emphasis on political 
resistance will be futile as Foucault’s work does not truly question what we mean 
when we refer to ‘life’. In this way Agamben attempts to connect political 
philosophy to ontology. However despite this attempt it is argued that Foucault’s 
own critical ontology produces a transcendent subject remarkably similar to 
Agamben’s life beyond biopower, calling into question Agamben’s attempt to go 
beyond Foucault. 
 The ‘ontology’ this article intends to explore is the ontology that Agamben 
and Foucault refer to in their works, indicating the force of being that exists both 
prior to all historical orders and exists in excess of those orders as well. Foucault 
sites this ontology within the resistance of the body, which is always prior to 
power and in excess of that power as well. Agamben sites his ontology within the 
figure of the immanent ‘whatever-Being’, a Being that deactivates the biopolitical 
order and institutes a new politics of pure means.  
 
II. Agamben and the Expulsion Thesis 
A continuing theme throughout the myriad of books and works of Giorgio 
Agamben is the concept of ‘the human’ and how life itself has been continuously 
defined and redefined by power. This question of ‘life’ is central to Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer series of books and his engagements with Foucault, as Agamben 
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aims at nothing less than the overcoming of Western metaphysics.1 It is from this 
position that Agamben’s engagements with Foucault should be viewed. 
 
A. Agambenian and Foucauldian Biopower 
The major engagement with the work of Foucault by Agamben begins at the very 
start of his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Here, Agamben 
states that he aims at nothing less than to “correct, or at least complete”2 Michel 
Foucault’s hypothesis of biopower that Foucault postulated in a series of lectures 
at the Collège de France in 1975 and 1976, published as Society Must Be 
Defended,3 and in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, published in 1976.4 
 Biopower was an analytic of power that focused not on sovereign power as 
the central source of power within the social body but instead upon disciplinary 
and normalising mechanisms designed to transform and influence human life. It is 
here, when life itself enters political calculations, that politics becomes 
‘biopolitics’. Such a move away from the classical view of sovereign power was 
necessary due to its negative form, being used against the populace to repress or 
prohibit,5 which was ineffective for the task of biopower, that of regulating life 
itself.6 For Foucault biopower was a direct combination of power and life, a 
                                                 
1
 The Homo Sacer series comprises of five books in total. The first volume is Giorgio Agamben 
and Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 1998); the second is Giorgio Agamben and Kevin Attell (trans.), State 
of Exception (University of Chicago Press, London 2005); the third is a yet untranslated volume 
entitled Il Regno e la Gloria (The Power and the Glory); the fourth is Giorgio Agamben and 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (Zone Books, 
New York 2002), and the final instalment is a yet unwritten book on what Agamben terms ‘forms-
of-life’, the life (and politics) to come. 
2
 Homo Sacer (n.1) 8. 
3
 Michel Foucault and David Macey (trans.), Society Must Be Defended, Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1975-76 (Penguin Books, London 2003). 
4
 Michel Foucault and Robert Hurley (trans.), The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An 
Introduction (Penguin Books, London 1978). 
5
 Katia Genel, ‘The Question of Biopower: Foucault and Agamben’ (2006) 18 Rethinking Marxism 
43-62, 48.  
6
 Society Must Be Defended (n.3) 249-50. 
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juncture which when explored requires the redefinition of both terms.7 
Foucauldian biopower has garnered a great deal of academic support – Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that in the last thirty years the process of biopower 
and biopolitical regulation has increased, so much so that today every aspect of 
social relations is subjected to the operations of this power.8 
Biopower and biopolitics complemented Foucault’s earlier works on the 
microphysics of power.9 Biopower superimposes itself over disciplinary power, 
with both forms of power functioning on different levels. Disciplinary power 
functions on the individual, focusing upon the individual’s body and its 
behaviour, by defining behaviour as normal or deviant. Disciplinary power thus 
complimented and dominated the juridical exercise of power by marking the 
boundaries of acceptable thought and practice and policed the social body through 
the exclusion of the abnormal and the alien. 
In contrast, biopower addresses itself to populations as a whole, separate from 
any notions of society, dealing with man as a species rather than an individual. 
Biopolitical measures direct themselves towards populations and large groups of 
people, dividing the masses into scientific groupings that can be subject to 
political intervention.10 Biopower does so through qualifying, measuring and 
appraising in order to create hierarchies and fields of apparatuses that function to 
regulate the different biological processes that affect populations, which better 
protects the population as a whole against phenomena that sap at its strength.11  
                                                 
7
 See Genel (n.5) 44. 
8
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2000) 12. 
9
 See Michel Foucault and Alan Sheridan (trans.), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(Penguin Books, London 1977). 
10
 Society Must Be Defended (n.3) 242-3. 
11
 Ibid., 243-4. 
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 It is at the very start of Homo Sacer that Agamben attempts to develop a 
critique of Foucauldian biopower and to formulate his own theory of biopolitics. 
Agamben contends that Foucault’s death prevented him from developing his 
nascent concept of biopolitics.12 Such a position is a mischaracterisation at best – 
biopower occupied a transitory moment in the thought of Foucault and was not a 
central part of Foucault’s analyses of power. The reason that biopower gained so 
little attention from Foucault was that biopower was not a refined enough 
category of power, which was why governmentality and apparatuses of security 
began to enter into his work.13 Foucault’s studies of biopower took him towards 
his later analyses of subjectivity – in works written after The History of Sexuality 
and Society Must Be Defended, although published before the latter book, 
Foucault argued that the subject, not power, was the overriding theme of his 
work.14 Despite this underdeveloped nature of biopower in Foucault’s work 
Agamben gives the concept a central place in his analyses. 
In addition to this mischaracterisation of the prominence of biopower in 
Foucault’s work, Agamben goes on to summarize a persistent feature of 
Foucault’s writings as including a: 
[D]ecisive abandonment of the traditional approach to the problem of 
power, which is based on juridico-institutional models (the definition of 
sovereignty, the theory of the State), in favour of an unprejudiced analysis 
of the concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects’ very bodies and 
forms of life.15  
 
                                                 
12
 Homo Sacer (n.1) 6. 
13
 See Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (Routledge, Abingdon 2009) 32, 49; 
Michel Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ in Michel Foucault, Robert Hurley (trans.) and Paul 
Rabinow (ed.), Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 1: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth 
(Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1997) 223-51. 
14
 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (Harvester Press, Brighton 1982) 208; Paul 
Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (Penguin Books, 
London 1991) 7-11. 
15
 Homo Sacer (n.1) 6. 
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Whilst Foucault did move away from traditional views of sovereignty, it is 
unclear what Agamben means when he refers to a “decisive abandonment”. This 
wording appears to indicate that Agamben views Foucault as having expunged all 
conception of the juridical and the law from his work, in favour of focusing upon 
normalising techniques of power. Such a position seems to be reinforced by 
Agamben’s summation of the Foucauldian project, which identifies two main 
strands of inquiry. The first is the study of political techniques with which the 
State assumes and integrates the care of natural life of individuals into its very 
centre, which can be seen in biopower and biopolitics. The second is the 
examination of the technologies of the self by which processes of subjectivisation 
bring the individual to bind himself to his own identity and consciousness and, at 
the same time, to an external power. This cam be seen clearly in disciplinary 
power. 
 It is here that Agamben tries to generate critical distance between his own 
project and that of Foucault’s. Agamben argues that Foucault’s inquiries result in 
an aporia which Foucault was not able to explain. Agamben contends that if 
Foucault was correct and the modern State has “integrated techniques of 
subjective individualisation with procedures of objective totalisation to an 
unprecedented stage”,16 the point at which these two powers converge remains 
unclear. For Agamben, Foucault’s contestation of the juridical model of power 
(including sovereignty) comes at the price of his failure to identify in the body of 
power the ‘zone of indistinction’ where the techniques of individualisation and 
totalising procedures come together.17 This invocation of a zone of indistinction 
                                                 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid., 6-7. 
 7
can be put in better context by citing Agamben’s own explanation of his 
methodology: 
When you take a classical distinction of the political-philosophical 
tradition such as public/private, then I find it much less interesting to 
insist on the distinction and to bemoan the diminution of one of the terms, 
than to question the interweaving. I want to understand how the system 
operates. And the system is always double; it works by means of 
opposition. Not only as public/private, but also the house and the city, the 
exception and the rule, to reign and to govern, etc. but in order to 
understand what is really at stake here, we must learn to see these 
oppositions not as “di-chotomies” but as “di-polarities”, not substantial, 
but tensional. I mean that we need a logic of the field, as in physics, 
where it is impossible to draw a line clearly and separate to different 
substances. The polarity is present and acts at each point of the field. 
Then you may suddenly have zones of indecideability or indifference.18 
 
The opposition of the techniques of subjective individualisation and the 
procedures are used by Agamben to try and find a zone of indistinction which will 
unconceal the operation of the analytic of power in Western politics. 
 The “hidden point of intersection” between these two analyses of power, the 
juridico-institutional and the biopolitical is not, for Agamben, an intersection at 
all, as the two forms of power cannot be separated.19 Instead, the two forms of 
power are bound together through sovereign power. Therefore Agamben’s 
biopower does not liberate individuals from the theoretical privilege of 
sovereignty but instead radically intensifies his work with sovereignty, a 
sovereignty that acts through the law to create and sustain political life.20 
 
B. The Expulsion Thesis 
                                                 
18
 Ulrich Raulff and Giorgio Agamben, ‘An Interview with Giorgio Agamben’ (2004) 5 German 
L. J. 609-614, 612. 
19
 Homo Sacer (n.1) 7. 
20
 Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford 2009) 210.  
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Agamben’s conception of biopolitics is one in which sovereign power and the law 
play a central role. To make his move from Foucault clear, Agamben 
characterizes Foucault as having moved away from juridical notions of power, 
juridical notions which Agamben (re)introduces into biopower. In doing so 
Agamben ends up endorsing a particular view of Foucault’s work, the expulsion 
thesis, which views Foucault as having abandoned the law within his work. 
The expulsion thesis was first proposed by Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, 
and maintained that for Foucault, law was irrelevant.21 At this preliminary stage it 
should be noted that Hunt and Wickham are by no means the only scholars who 
shared this view of Foucault’s interpretation of law.22 It is also important to note 
that the expulsion thesis is based upon selective readings of Foucault which do 
seem to indicate that the philosopher did exclude law from his writings on power.  
The expulsion thesis viewed Foucault’s formulations of power as 
incompatible with traditional views of sovereignty and law. Ben Golder and Peter 
Fitzpatrick summarize the expulsion thesis succinctly in stating that it views 
Foucault’s characterisation of law as essentially negative, historically tied to 
monarchical sovereignty and overtaken by more productive technologies of 
power.23 Law and sovereignty are viewed as having been superseded by other 
forms of power such as discipline, governmentality and biopower. 
By focusing upon Foucault’s writings on biopower at the expense of his other 
works Agamben reads into Foucault an abandonment of law and juridical 
categories and knowingly or not aligns himself with the expulsion thesis of Hunt 
                                                 
21
 Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance 
(Pluto Press, London 1994). 
22
 For example, Duncan Kennedy and Nicos Poulantzas have supported versions of the expulsion 
thesis. See Nicos Poulantzas and Patrick Camiller (trans.), State, Power, Socialism (Verso, London 
2000) 149; Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!’ (1991) 15 Legal Studies 
Forum 327-366, 353-55. 
23
 Foucault’s Law (n.13) 14. 
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and Wickham. As such, Agamben reads Foucault selectively and to his advantage. 
Such criticisms of Agamben are by no means unusual, and have been made 
previously by Peter Fitzpatrick about Agamben’s Homo Sacer project.24  
 Such a characterisation of Foucault is troubling, not least because it belies the 
myriad of views that counter the expulsion thesis. In their book Foucault’s Law 
Golder and Fitzpatrick identify three approaches to Foucault and law that have 
been made that they place in opposition to the expulsion thesis. First is the view 
that law and discipline and disciplinary power are not opposed but are in fact 
interrelated. Law is interdependent with discipline, and the democratic 
characterisation of law masks the control of the populace through disciplinary 
measures.25 Law in modernity does not recede, but becomes more involved in 
disciplinary control. Therefore the two interacted, overlapped and articulated one 
another, as well as being in a state of tension and confrontation.26 Such a position 
still gives law a peripheral role in the social body, with it dependent upon 
disciplinary control and still reliant upon disciplinary power for its operation. 
The second approach focuses upon Foucault’s examination of 
governmentality. Hunt and Wickham here note that Foucault returns to the 
question of law.27 Governmentality refers to attempts by political theorists from 
the eighteenth century onwards to develop an ‘art of government’, focusing not on 
maintaining sovereign power but instead on the care and maximisation of the 
                                                 
24
 See Peter Fitzpatrick ‘Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the Insistence of Law’ in Andrew 
Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Duke 
University Press, Durham 2005) 51.  
25
 See, for example, Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde, ‘Governed by Law?’ (1998) 7 Social 
and Legal Studies 541-551; Anthony Beck, ‘Foucault and Law: The Collapse of Law’s Empire’ 
(1996) 16 OJLS 489-502. 
26
 Foucault’s Law (n.13) 29. 
27
 Ibid., 55.  
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potential of the population itself,28 which in turn maximizes governmentality’s 
own potential.29 Governmentality operates alongside disciplinary power,30 which 
has led to scholars rehabilitating law in Foucault’s work, arguing that law has 
become part of the wider dispersal of government sites throughout the social 
body.31 Yet Foucault’s governmentality seems to show that law has become the 
pliant instrument of a governmental apparatus rather than existing as a discipline 
on its own.32 In this way, law still remains subsumed and reliant on the 
disciplines. 
Thirdly there is the semantic argument that Foucault’s usage of the terms 
‘juridical’ and ‘legal’ are not synonymous. Although Foucault argued that 
biopower inhabits the space that the juridical retreats from, François Ewald argues 
that this does not mean that law is in decline.33 Instead, disciplinary technologies 
are coterminous with a proliferation of legality. The juridical simply signifies the 
institution of law as the expression of a sovereign’s power. The law thus continues 
to exist as a normative device, following Foucault’s argument in The History of 
Sexuality that in the biopolitical age “law operates more and more as a norm”.34 
Yet this movement tying the law to the functioning of the norm would end up 
eventually assimilating the law to the norm, still leaving law with a subordinate 
position in the analytic of power.35 
Agamben’s summarisation of the Foucauldian project is a position that does 
not have the nuance of the above three examples. Agamben supposes a 
                                                 
28
 See Michel Foucault and Graham Burchell (trans.), Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at 
the Collège de France 1977-78 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2007) 74, 89. 
29
 Foucault’s Law (n.13) 32.  
30
 Security, Territory, Population (n.28) 107-8. 
31
 Foucault’s Law (n.13) 33.  
32
 Ibid., 34.  
33
 François Ewald and Marjorie Beale, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law’ in Robert Post (ed.) Law 
and the Order of Culture (University of California Press, Berkeley 1991) 138-61. 
34
 The History of Sexuality (n.4) 144. 
35
 Foucault’s Law (n.13) 38. 
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dejuridicized biopower which is used as a tool to construct his own form of 
biopower that aims to radically move away from Foucault’s work. However, it is 
clear from Golder and Fitzpatrick’s own post-structuralist reading of Foucault that 
Foucault’s conception of law is in fact markedly similar to Agamben’s 
reconstruction of law and biopower.  
 
III. Agamben, Foucault and Law  
Agamben approaches Foucault’s writings on biopower not only from the 
expulsion thesis, but also from the work of Aristotle. In the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault referred to Aristotle’s definition of man 
when he summarized the process by which life was included within the 
mechanisms of State power: 
For millennia, man remains what he was for Aristotle: a living animal 
with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an 
animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.36 
 
Agamben builds upon this Aristotelian definition of man, and returns directly to 
the Greek text of the Politics where Aristotle defines the proper end of man as 
‘life according to the good’. Agamben argues that for the Greeks there was no one 
word that described ‘life’. Such a conclusion is by no means unusual 
linguistically; many languages have multiple words that describe the same thing. 
Leland de la Durantaye notes that the Inuit have four words that designate ‘snow’. 
Yet ‘life’ carries much more fundamental connotations than ‘snow’. By declaring 
that the Greeks had no one word to describe this seemingly self-evident condition 
Agamben sets about challenging the basis of modern political existence.37 
                                                 
36
 The History of Sexuality (n.4) 143. 
37
 See de la Durantaye (n.20) 210. 
 12
 
A. Bios, zoē and ‘bare life’ 
Agamben re-reads Aristotle’s Politics, and in doing so distinguishes between zoē, 
which denoted the basic fact of living common to all living beings, be they 
animals, men or gods, and bios, which was the form or way of living proper to an 
individual or group: 
This [life according to the good] is certainly the chief end, both of 
individuals and of states. And mankind meet together and maintain the 
political community also for the sake of mere life [kata to zēn auto 
monon] (in which there is possibly some noble element [kata ton bion] so 
long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good). And 
we all see that men cling to life [zoē] even at the cost of enduring great 
misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness.38 
 
Bios is seen by Aristotle as the proper end of man, how man exists as a political 
animal. Every bios is equally built upon zoē, natural life. It is this distinction that 
Agamben argues first brought life into the political sphere, and makes Aristotle 
into the father of biopolitics. Thus biopolitics is not, as Foucault would have it, an 
invention of modernity. Rather, it is as old as modernity itself.  
 Bios strikes Agamben as an interesting concept as it is effectively an empty 
referent. Political life does not have meaning in and of itself, as it always needs to 
be held in relation to natural life, zoē, in order to give substance to its content. It is 
Agamben’s contention that today bios is found in the political existence given 
meaning by the great Conventions and declarations of rights started in the 
1800’s.39 Despite rights and duties being inscribed on to bios, bios only gains 
meaning through being held in relation to what it is not, namely zoē. The 
“decisive event of modernity” in Agamben’s eyes is the entry of zoē into the polis, 
                                                 
38
 Aristotle, Politics, 1278b, 23-31, in Aristotle and Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, Volume Two (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984); Homo Sacer (n.1) 1. 
39
 Homo Sacer (n.1) 181. 
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the political sphere, the very act that allows bios to ground itself against a 
politicized zoē. 
 This politicized zoē is termed ‘bare life’, a life that is without the rights and 
duties of bios but a life that is still trapped within the political realm and therefore 
vulnerable to the operations of power that may act against it. Almost 
paradoxically, the most important figure to Western politics is not the rights-
imbued individual characterized by bios, but instead bare life, for without bare life 
bios cannot ground itself. It is bare life that maintains political existence, yet at the 
same time is anathema to the very system it maintains, the very system that denies 
that bare life can exist.  
 Is this position defensible however? Agamben grants primacy to a specific 
reading of the Politics, and by reading Foucault’s biopower as beginning with 
Aristotle Agamben risks positing an extremely arbitrary basis for his 
reinterpretation of biopower not based upon empirical evidence.40 Before 
Agamben’s work is dismissed, it is important not to view him as a historian, or his 
studies as a sociological investigation. As opposed to Foucault, Agamben uses 
paradigms in order to construct philosophical investigations. This is an important 
distinction that should be drawn between the two philosophers.  
 Agamben uses bare life, illustrated by the figure from Roman law, homo 
sacer, the sacred man, as a paradigm representing the necessity of bare life for all 
political existence. A paradigm for Agamben is similar to an example, the 
significance of which he explained in The Coming Community: 
In any context where it exerts its force, the example is characterized by 
the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, 
it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, which, 
                                                 
40
 See Andrew Norris, ‘The Exemplary Exception: Philosophical and Political Decisions in 
Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer’ in Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: 
Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Duke University Press, Durham 2005) 262. 
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however, stands for each of them and serves them all. On one hand, every 
example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it 
remains understood that it cannot serve its particularity. Neither particular 
nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, 
that shows its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term, for 
example: para-deigma, that which is shown alongside … Hence the 
proper place of the example is always beside itself, in the empty space in 
which its undefinable and unforgettable life unfolds.41  
 
The paradigm as an example is described by Agamben as a “historically singular 
phenomenon” comparable to Foucault’s use of the Panopticon in his work.42 The 
paradigm is neither clearly inside nor clearly outside the group or set of 
phenomena that it identifies. Rather, a paradigm is the real particular case that is 
set apart from what it is meant to exemplify.43  
 Agamben traces his paradigmatic method directly to Foucault, and Agamben 
has stated that this method is a ‘philosophical archaeology’ that does not deal with 
origins, akin to Foucault’s genealogical tradition that also quested against a search 
for origins.44 Rather, philosophical archaeology searches for the point of 
emergence of the phenomenon, the source of its existence. Therefore Agamben’s 
archaeology is an ontological examination of a phenomenon which will enable 
‘the thing itself’ to be grasped.45 A focus upon origins implies a ‘before’, 
presupposing an original condition that existed and split into the various 
phenomena being studied, for example a pure ‘life’ that split into bios and zoē. 
This in turn represents a belief that this ‘before’ was a golden age that needs to be 
returned to – a belief that Agamben does not share. Despite Agamben equating his 
                                                 
41
 Giorgio Agamben and Michael Hardt (trans.), The Coming Community (University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis 2007) 9-10. 
42
 Raulff and Agamben (n.18) 610. 
43
 de la Durantaye (n.20) 218-9. 
44
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paradigmatic method with that of Foucault’s, it should be more properly 
understood as a radicalisation of Foucault’s methodology.  
 The force behind Foucault’s method is that the examples he uses within his 
work are less paradigmatic than historical. For example, Foucault’s paradigm of 
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon stands as an emblematic figure for a new age of 
power and governmental control.46 Despite the Panopticon never being built to its 
original design, a number of prisons influenced by Bentham’s concept were 
built.47 Therefore to reduce Foucault to a paradigmatic philosopher does seem to 
minimize the historical relevance that his ideas had.  
 With Agamben, the figure of homo sacer stands as an example for the 
necessity of bare life to the existence of the political order and its continual 
actualisation within that order, allowing him to understand the historical structure 
of biopower and its operation with and through the law and sovereignty. Agamben 
also strives to demonstrate the historical actualisation of bare life throughout 
antiquity and modernity. Primarily these actualisations are not examples of a 
genealogy of bare life, but rather a genealogy of the paradigm, singular 
phenomenon that together constitute a wider problematic.48  
 Perhaps due to this radicalisation of Foucault’s method Agamben’s use of 
paradigms throughout his philosophical works has been very widely criticized by 
philosophers and historians such as Ernesto Laclau for purveying a “distorted 
history” as well as a view of the present that reflects “political nihilism”.49 Laclau 
does not simply oppose the principle of the paradigmatic method however, but 
seems to misread Agamben’s use of paradigms as standing for examples that must 
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be followed. Rather, as Leland de la Durantaye observes, Agamben’s paradigms 
are examples, albeit extreme, that explore the emancipatory possibilities that exist 
in modernity. To dismiss Agamben as deterministic, as Laclau does, misses the 
key thrust of Agamben’s method.50  
 To summarize, Leland de la Durantaye sees the strengths of the Homo Sacer 
project as inseparable from its weaknesses in its radicalisation of Foucault’s 
method.51 It is Agamben’s insistence that paradigms can be both concrete 
historical instances as well as representing broader philosophical concepts that 
appears to form the biggest objection to his thought.52 It should be realized that 
Agamben’s use of paradigms is complex, both central to his thought and 
developed from that of Foucault’s; any criticism of Agamben must therefore be 
careful not to misunderstand Agamben’s aims and not implicitly call into question 
Foucault’s own conclusions and methodology. 
 
B. Agamben, Law and Bare Life 
Agamben builds upon this zoē/bios opposition at the start of Homo Sacer to 
develop his formulations of how law and biopower interact. While Foucault 
joined together both disciplinary power and biopower at the micro and macro 
levels respectively, with disciplinary power affecting the individual and biopower 
operating at the level of populations,53 Agamben replaces this distinction, with 
biopower being tied directly to the individual. Power acts in both creating and 
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maintaining bios, political life, by directly acting upon zoē and granting natural 
life the political rights that transform it into bios.54  
 Agambenian biopower therefore subsumes disciplinary power. Unlike 
Foucault, who saw both forms of power as attempting to cover all of life, 
Agamben’s biopower can be described as totalising in its operation. This 
biopolitics, far from complimenting the disciplines, or existing in a tensional 
relation with normative operations of power, is today causing disciplinary 
institutions to retreat in their influence over life.55 
 Yet at the same time this biopower is aligned with and acts through the law. 
Agambenian biopower aims to transform all zoē into bios, attempting to regulate, 
order and increase power’s hold over every human action. Life is aligned with and 
lived through the law. Political life, bios, becomes a legal subject, as the juridical 
order constructs legal subjects that can be acted upon by power. There are no 
longer separate spheres of power, only a juridical biopower. Thus Agamben 
argues that biopower aims to dominate every aspect of being a human; there can 
be no human actions that are outside of biopolitical regulation and control. 
 In this manner biopower and the biopolitical juridical order maintain the 
fiction of ‘immanentism’.56 Sergei Prozorov describes immanentism as having the 
aim to recast the social order as a closed universal self-propelling system without 
an outside. Immanentism denies that there can be any human action ‘outside’ of 
the order, as it denies that such an ‘outside’ exists. It is a fiction because such a 
view presupposes an all-encompassing social order that is always already 
encapsulating acts that have not yet happened – the order is given omnipotent and 
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omniscient powers as it is able to subsume any act within itself. The analogy 
needs to be modified slightly here as Agamben deals primarily with a juridical 
order, rather than a social order. The distinction made between legality and 
illegality may not necessarily correlate with Foucauldian concepts of normality 
and abnormality developed in Discipline and Punish. Agamben sees human 
actions as constrained not by denotations of normality, but by denoting them as 
legal or otherwise. Nevertheless, Prozorov’s conception of immanentism is 
helpful here in analogising the structure of Agambenian biopower.  
 Agamben’s totalising biopower ties in directly to his notion of bare life, the 
necessary yet contradictory element of his formulation of biopower, by focusing 
upon, and modifying, Carl Schmitt’s concept of the sovereign decision.57 For 
Schmitt, sovereignty was not identifiable through statutes, ordinances or 
constitutions, but instead rested on one concrete political fact, namely which 
individual or body could declare a state of exception and thus suspend the existing 
legal order. It was therefore the decision, rather than any pre-ordained power, that 
decided who was sovereign.  
 Adopting and modifying Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, Agamben 
contends that the sovereign and sovereign power can be identified through the 
creation of bare life; the individual or body that creates bare life will be by 
definition imbibed with sovereign power. This sovereign decision is tied directly 
to the operation of law. In State of Exception Agamben posits bare life not only 
being created through a sovereign decision, but also through the operation of the 
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law, and specifically through the state of exception which exists as a zone of 
indistinction between law and anomie, law’s beyond.58 
 
C. The State of Exception 
The state of exception is not a true exception as understood by the theorists of 
emergency powers, as Agamben denies that the exception can be temporally or 
spatially separated from the norm. Instead the exception is a zone of indistinction 
where law and fact completely coincide. In his work on the exception Agamben 
distinguishes between the juridical order (il diritto) and the law (la legge). The 
juridical order maintains the fiction of immanentism; the abstract notion of ‘law’ 
presupposes that it applies to all of reality, to all of life itself. Whilst the law (la 
legge) of a State may be unprincipled and contain lacunae in certain areas,59 the 
juridical order maintains that there are no lacunae, in the sense that the juridical 
order covers all lacunae and all situations that arise. The fiction of immanentism 
is maintained even when the law seems conflict and contradict itself internally.  
 Agamben’s exception then does not exist as separate from or as dichotomous 
to the law. Although Agamben appropriates Schmitt’s notion of the sovereign 
decision, he argues that attempts to relate the exception into the juridical order 
result in paradoxes and aporias which cannot be explained. If the exception is 
contained within the juridical order as part of positive law, such as the process of 
derogation, then the paradoxical situation arises where the exception that suspends 
the juridical order is contained within the very object – the juridical order – that it 
is suspending.60 Likewise, if the exception is, like Schmitt maintains, a purely 
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political, de facto, extra-juridical situation, then the juridical order must contain a 
lacuna precisely where the decisive situation concerning its existence in the face 
of grave threats exists. To conclude this is to support a fiction that the juridical 
order does not legislate for exceptions, which is patently not the case.61 
 Agamben has argued that in the twentieth century, with increasing recourse to 
emergency governance in Western democracies, the exception can no longer be 
distinguished from the norm, and today we live in a permanent state of exception. 
This is quite a curious claim, taking into account his works on the primacy of the 
figure of bare life and his emphasis upon the paradigmatic method. It appears, at 
least on the face of things that Agamben embarks upon a genealogical diversion 
explaining how the exception developed throughout the twentieth century. With 
his statement in Homo Sacer that the exception is the originary form of the law,62 
it may be questionable to state that the exception has become the norm only 
during the twentieth century.  
 Despite this point, Agamben’s development of the concept of the exception 
deserves further attention. The exception is neither inherent to law, nor other to 
law; the problem of defining the exception cannot be resolved through a simple 
opposition of inside/outside. Rather, the exception should be understood as a 
‘zone of indistinction’ where inside and outside blur with one another.  
 Agamben explains the importance of the exception for the law through the 
analogy of language and linguistics. Agamben argues that the law and language 
are interconnected; the aporias to be found in language are equally to be found in 
law. Thus linguistic elements exist in langue, in language, without any real 
meaning. These linguistic elements only gain meaning through their use in actual 
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speech, parole. Equally, speech, concrete linguistic activity, only gains meaning 
if a language is presupposed.63 The relationship between speech and language is 
not based upon any logical operation; the only way in which a generic proposition 
endowed with a merely virtual reference (e.g. a ‘tree’) passes to a concrete 
reference that corresponds to a segment of reality is through a practical activity 
(presupposing what is meant when the linguistic element ‘tree’ is used). 
 As it is for language, so it is for law. The application of a norm is in no way 
contained within the norm and cannot be derived from the norm. There is no 
internal logical nexus that allows the norm to be derived from its application.64 
The nexus that holds the norm in relation to its application is found in the 
exception, which exists as a zone of indistinction where the norm and application 
reveal their separation. In other words, in the exception the norm is applied even 
though its application has been suspended. In order to apply a norm, it is 
ultimately necessary to produce an exception, to suspend its application. 
 This can be seen most clearly in the case of necessity, which shows the being-
in-force of the law even though it is suspended. In a case of necessity, legal norms 
still remain in force, yet the norm is not applied to a concrete factual situation. In 
effect, the law is suspended but still remains in force.65 Equally, factual situations 
that are justified through necessity can gain legal status, in that they do not 
constitute transgressions of the law. In this way, an act that contradicts legal 
norms can gain legal force. 
 However the decisive act to which necessity applies elides all definition, in 
that it is neither fact nor law. If the act is considered legal and not factual, then 
why, asks Agamben, does that act need to be approved ex post facto by a judicial 
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or legislative decision?66 Yet if the decisive act is considered as factual rather 
than legal, then another problem arises, namely that the legal effects of the action 
begin not from the moment that it is converted from law to fact at the moment of 
decision after the event, but from the very moment of its taking place. The law’s 
retroactive ratification of such necessary acts, delimiting them as lawful, can be 
seen as a fiction, concealing the very status of the act of necessity.  
 Far from being a matter of law or a matter of fact, the act of necessity is a 
zone of indistinction that is subsumed into the law and considered legal in 
character, despite the fact that the actual necessary act defies all logical 
subsumption into either fact or law. Every interpretative act thus becomes an 
instance of the exception, trying to contain within the law that act which is neither 
law nor fact, and in doing so legitimising the act of bare power which has 
occurred in the ‘necessary’ act. 
 The law therefore becomes completely indistinct and is exercised solely 
through a concrete praxis in the exception, a zone of indistinction. Agamben 
concludes that the exception is the opening of a fictitious lacuna in the juridical 
order. It is fictitious as the lacuna is not real and there is no ‘gap’ in the law that 
the judge has to fill. Instead the lacuna is fictitious as it suspends the order that is 
in force, “safeguarding the existence of the norm and its applicability to the 
normal situation”.67 Through suspending the norm the exception guarantees the 
norm’s pre-eminence for future cases; only by demarcating when the norm does 
not apply can it be possible to constitute and give the norm its content.  
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 This leads to the exception having some curious characteristics. First, in the 
zone of indistinction all legal determinations are deactivated,68 but this does not 
mean that there is no law in the exception. The exception is full of legality, and, 
perhaps even more curiously, this means that potentially any action taken in the 
exception can gain legal force.69 Yet the exception is not part of the law, or the 
juridical order. To presuppose this would be to reduce the exception to a function 
of law, and misses the key point about the actions that occur in the state of 
exception, namely their radical dis-location to the juridical order and the potential 
for any act to gain legal status.  
 The legal norm is suspended but still in force, but in thus suspending the 
norm the norm’s ‘force-of-law’ is also separated from its application. By ‘force-
of-law’ Agamben refers to the constitutive essence of the law, the element that 
literally gives laws, decrees and other measures their ‘force’.70 With the norm 
remaining in force but not being applied, acts that do not have the value of law 
can acquire the ‘force-of-law’ that is separated from the norm’s application. Such 
acts are characterized by Agamben as having the force-of-law (without law), the 
norm still being in force but not being applied. The force-of-law (without law) 
can be claimed by both the State and non-State groups not just to justify their 
actions, but to give them the force-of-law, to make their actions legal.71  
 The exception is tied by Agamben directly to both the operation of the 
sovereign decision to create bare life and the exercise of law. Drawing upon his 
analysis of the relationship of the norm to its application, Agamben argues that it 
is through the exception that the bare life that the political order requires to 
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operate is created. Because bare life is created through the exception, it is created 
through a zone of indistinction that is neither fact nor law. In this way, drawing 
upon Agamben’s analysis, it is possible to conclude that the creation of bare life 
in the exception can gain the force-of-law (without law). This allows an action 
that may contradict legal norms to suspend those norms and at the same time be 
declared as legal. In this way the law can remain in force yet not be applied to 
bare life. Such an analysis calls into question the efficacy of all legal rights in 
protecting the individual against the power controlled by the State. 
 
D. Agamben, Benjamin and the Exception 
To help support these arguments Agamben draws upon the work of Walter 
Benjamin, and specifically his Critique of Violence, ‘Zur Kritik der Gewalt’ in the 
original German.72 Gewalt signifies legitimized force or judicial power and also 
carries the meanings of authority, dominion, might and control.73 In this text, 
Benjamin made explicit the connection between law and violence (Gewalt). For 
Benjamin, law and violence are intertwined and cannot be separated. Violence is 
the foundation of law, although today the law seems not to recognize its violent 
past. Benjamin argued that modern law has developed out of the violent 
revolutions and wars of the past and it preserves itself through violence by 
stopping challenges to the law and legitimising its own actions. 
 Benjamin posited two forms of violence to illustrate the connection violence 
has to law: ‘law-making violence’, violence used against the existing laws and 
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conditions with the effect of constituting new laws, and ‘law-preserving 
violence’, which maintains the authority and laws of the current system. Despite 
the differences between the two types of violence, Saul Newman argues that they 
both lead to a perpetuation of the law and power as neither type of violence 
affects the law’s position; law-making and law-preserving violence are used 
everyday by the law in order to perpetuate itself. 74 In other words, every legal act 
can be classified as using law-making violence or law-preserving violence.  
 Agamben argues that the exception extends the legal violence Benjamin 
explored beyond its own boundaries by making it possible for extra-legal actions 
to acquire legal status, to gain force-of-law.75 The exception as a zone of 
indistinction deactivates the law that is contained within it. In doing so it produces 
a violence that has “shed every relation to law”,76 making it appropriable by 
anyone, potentially allowing any action to acquire legal force through this legal 
violence that has shed its relation to law: 
It is as if the suspension of law freed a force… that both the ruling power 
and its adversaries, the constituted power as well as the constituent 
power, seek to appropriate.77 
 
The paradox Agamben identifies is that suspending law only increases its violent 
activity; the exception produces law-making violence through the law’s 
suspension. 
 Building upon this paradox, which Agamben states is representative of the 
force-of-law (without law), Agamben argues that the biopolitical law is caught 
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within a dialectic akin to Benjamin’s dialectic of violence. Any legal attempt to 
subsume or contain the exception within the law does not work because the 
exception by its very definition is a zone of indistinction where legal terms are 
deactivated, thus escaping the very law that sought to contain it. Therefore the 
sovereign decision creating bare life will always already be legal, allowing 
Agamben to predict that: 
The normative aspect of law can… be obliterated and contradicted with 
impunity by a governmental violence that – whilst ignoring international 
law externally and producing a state of exception internally – nevertheless 
claims to be applying the law.78 
 
E. Foucault, Post-Structuralism and Law 
In Foucault’s Law, Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick reinterpret Foucault’s 
writings on law and develop a Foucauldian approach to law that is markedly 
similar to Agamben’s own direction. Their approach does not have the theoretical 
drawback of existing within a violent dialectic where power subsumes political 
resistance within itself. This post-structuralist account of law does not get 
subsumed by relations of power, although it is susceptible to domination by 
power.79 
 It is Golder and Fitzpatrick’s argument that Foucault did not do away with 
either sovereignty or law in modernity but on the contrary, the two persisted in an 
integral relation.80 In fact, it is disciplinary power that is dependent upon the law, 
a law which acts as a constituent power in relation to the disciplines.81 It is 
through the law acting as a restraint to disciplinary power that the law actually 
constitutes disciplinary power, rather than being subsumed under disciplinary 
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power as the expulsion thesis argues. By acting in a supervisory jurisdiction over 
the abuses and excesses of the disciplines, law implicitly confirms the claim at the 
heart of disciplinary power to adjudicate on questions of normality and social 
cohesion.82 By the law confining its jurisdiction to the periphery of the disciplines 
the core of disciplinary power is left reinforced, whilst at the same time the 
disciplines remain constituently reliant upon law to curb their abuses.83 In this 
way, the law masks the disciplinary domination through offering the veil of 
legality; law and the disciplines exist within a relation where they are dependent 
on one another. 
 This reading of Foucault eschews Agamben’s reductivist reading that 
prioritizes biopower and biopolitics over and above the disciplines. Instead of the 
law and biopower intertwining in the decision on life itself, Foucault envisioned 
that the law and the disciplines interacted and in contrast to the expulsion thesis, it 
is the law that is the most important factor in the operations of power, not the 
other way around. Yet Golder and Fitzpatrick’s argument does not just involve a 
reconstruction of Foucault’s thought on law. The authors put forward a post-
structuralist reading of Foucault’s law which has markedly similar features to the 
biopolitical law constructed by Agamben. Golder and Fitzpatrick argue that 
Foucault’s law is both determinate and illimitable. The law contains a determinate 
element which has a definite content as well as an illimitable element that is 
always already extending itself to encompass and respond to what is outside the 
law’s definite content. The law is constantly in excess of its determinate self.84 
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 More than this, Golder and Fitzpatrick claim that Foucault saw power as 
responsive and formed by resistance; power always acts after resistance.85 As it is 
for power, so it is for law. Law has a definitive content but also must be formed 
and re-formed by resistance, a constant resistance that is other to the law but to 
which the law responds and accommodates.86 This post-structuralist law already 
anticipates its own beyond and resistances to it, responding to and continually 
creating modes of political resistance to dominant power relations. In this sense, it 
is a political law, one open to futurity, yet always determinate. Law needs its 
determinacy and equally needs its responsiveness. Law cannot be a settled 
determinate fact as it would not be able to respond to new events and possibilities; 
likewise, law cannot remain purely responsive as to do so would be to reduce it to 
a vacuity.87 
 The parallels with Agamben are clear, with Agamben’s ‘illimitable’ law 
represented by the exception as a zone of indistinction which can make legal those 
acts that may contradict and even violate the determinate laws in force but not 
applied. While Agamben’s exception exists as a zone of indistinction that can lead 
to actions that contradict determinate laws as being denoted as legal, increasing 
the juridical order’s grip over life, Foucault’s illimitable law is self-resistant. The 
law for Foucault constantly disrupts itself through becoming receptive of 
resistances that constantly challenge its position. 
 Therefore Agamben’s position is open to a double criticism – not only has he 
invoked a version of the expulsion thesis in order to demonstrate how his work 
differs from that of Foucault, this very different work is very similar to a post-
                                                 
85
 Ibid., 75; The History of Sexuality (n.4) 93, 95. 
86
 Foucault’s Law (n.13) 77-82; see also Michel Foucault and Brain Massumi (trans.), ‘Maurice 
Blanchot: The Thought from Outside’ in Foucault/Blanchot (Zone Books, New York 1987) 9-58. 
87
 Peter Fitzpatrick and Richard Joyce, ‘The Normality of the Exception in Democracy’s Empire’ 
(2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 65-76. 
 29
structuralist reading of Foucault, only Agamben’s law appears to offer little in the 
way of definite political direction for action. These critiques appear to assume that 
Agamben’s philosophy is that of post-Foucauldian thought of some kind. In fact, 
the reason that Agamben challenges Foucault’s primacy of resistance against 
power is that he argues that Foucault has failed to challenge, ultimately, the 
ontological question of what life is.  
 
F. Foucault, Agamben and Resistance 
From this analysis the position given to resistance in Foucault’s and Agamben’s 
philosophies can be summarized. For a post-structuralist (although not necessarily 
for Foucault himself), Foucault’s law can be constructed as the site of resistance, 
with the law reacting to resistance and therefore always opening up to political 
possibilities. Resistance thus becomes the driving force behind the law and the 
operations of power.  
 Foucauldian resistance is grounded in life because Foucault argued that life 
has not been totally integrated into the techniques that govern it but constantly 
resists their domination.88 Foucault’s biopower consists of a constellation of 
various technologies, all of which have life itself as their object. As such, the 
“‘right’ to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs” 
were the political response, grounded in zoē, to the procedures of biopower that 
proliferated throughout the social body.89 Life must provide the opposition to the 
operations of biopower, resisting the processes of subjugation that are in operation 
in the technologies of biopower, precisely because biopolitics relies upon life and 
man as a living being to support its investments of power. Foucault sees the 
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potential for resisting the domination of biopolitics within the body, and 
specifically in a different economy of bodies and pleasures that would be able to 
break free of the control of power.90 
 Agamben’s consideration of Benjamin’s dialectic of violence leads him to 
conclude that true resistance cannot be grounded in the current biopolitical power. 
Any attempt to ground resistance within the current system of power does not yet 
challenge the primacy of bare life to the political order and therefore will not 
prevent bare life from being created. It is this that leads Agamben to dismiss 
Foucault’s own way forward as ultimately futile. Agamben claims that the very 
body that Foucault wishes to use as a base a possible horizon for a different 
politics is always already a biopolitical body and therefore always already bare 
life, as it remains trapped within the juridical order that constitutes and creates 
bare life through the zone of indistinction of the state of exception.  
 Agamben can dismiss Foucault’s point of resistance because Foucault’s 
attempt to theorize a new body escaping the powers of the State does not fit with 
Agamben’s wider project, which can be summarized as an attempt to take up 
Walter Benjamin’s suggestion that the origin of the dogma of the sacredness of 
life should be investigated.91 It is Agamben’s aim to challenge the very grounding 
of political life within zoē and break free of bare life, which he does not see as 
possible within the framework of thought Foucault bequeathed. In fact, Agamben 
argues that Foucault, in grounding his resistance within the body, will not allow 
for the sovereign decision that creates bare life to be opposed, ostensibly because 
Agamben implies that the only way to oppose the sovereign decision is to 
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question sovereignty itself from outside of the zoē/bios dialectic.92 This 
demonstrates a rather narrow view of Foucauldian resistance to power. By 
seemingly concluding that Foucauldian resistance is based around the body, 
Agamben too quickly dismisses the Foucauldian project. As noted by Golder and 
Fitzpatrick, for Foucault, resistance is prior to power and is thus found in every 
aspect of power relations, not narrowly within the body alone.  
 Agamben positions his work in such a way that he therefore needs a strategy 
to overcome both biopolitics and bare life, a strategy that he cannot find by 
grounding that resistance within the biopolitical order. Agamben therefore 
attempts to unconceal a life beyond the dialectic of bare life. In doing this 
Agamben’s project aims to connect political philosophy with ontology, arguing 
that resistance will only be meaningful if life itself is (re)examined. This strategy 
is implicitly linked to law, sovereignty and the philosophical category of 
potentiality. Paradoxically, it is precisely when faced with such a seemingly 
hopeless situation that Agamben is filled with hope.93 
 However, it is questionable just how ontological Agamben’s philosophy is, 
indeed whether Agamben’s enquiry into life and potentiality is ontological at all. 
In addition Agamben’s emphasis upon the ontological in his works leads to a lack 
of determinacy in political action being evident in his work. This means that 
Agamben’s wider philosophy may have the drawback of formulating a philosophy 
that is both philosophically and politically deficient. In his attempt to re-think 
ontology Agamben radically redefines the concept of sovereignty away from both 
traditional interpretations and the interpretation given it by Foucault, which calls 
into question the relation between power, law and life.  
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IV. The Sovereign Law of Agamben 
Agamben’s attempt to connect political philosophy with ontology draws upon the 
work of Aristotle, specifically his definition of potentiality which Agamben 
connects with sovereignty, redefining both terms, which in turn influences the 
connections Agamben makes between potentiality, law and life. Specifically 
important here are the different conceptions of sovereignty put forward by 
Foucault and Agamben. Foucault’s writings focus upon a deconstructing of 
classical concepts of sovereignty, with the concept occupying an important, if 
fundamentally different role in his analyses than it had for classical theorists of 
sovereignty and law. In comparison, Agamben’s use of sovereignty is much more 
critical and central to his overall philosophical schema. Yet despite Agamben’s re-
envisioning of sovereignty and his attempt to redraw politics and political 
involvement on an ontological level, Agamben’s position is not so distant from 
that of Foucault’s critical ontology. With this in mind, the two philosophers’ 
conceptions of sovereignty can be contrasted.  
 
A. Foucault’s Sovereignty 
One of the key features of Foucault’s work is his separation of disciplinary power, 
biopower and his analyses of governmentality from conceptions of sovereignty 
that were tied directly to monarchical characterisations of law.94 Thus Foucault 
could argue that disciplinary power applied to codes of normalisation in the 
human sciences, not legal sovereignty.95 Despite this, Foucault did not abandon 
sovereignty or sovereign power – there is no sovereign expulsion thesis. 
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Biopower, disciplinary power and sovereign power manage to cover as large a 
surface of the population as possible, with all three forms of power exercising 
themselves over different areas of the population for different reasons in different 
ways.96  
 Power relations therefore exist at all levels of the social body and interact with 
one another across these levels. Power relations act not directly upon individuals 
as classical views of sovereignty would posit, but instead on actions themselves, 
either existing actions of those individuals or upon actions that may arise in the 
future.97 Sovereignty can be classically seen as violence which does directly apply 
itself directly on to individuals bodies,98 but power “incites, induces, seduces, 
makes easier or more difficult…constrains or forbids absolutely”;99 always acting 
upon an individual through their actions or their capability to act. Power should be 
studied on the basis of the relationship between the individual and the State itself, 
asking how relations of subjugation can manufacture subjects.  
 This does not mean that sovereign power fails to persist into modernity. 
Foucault described how sovereignty could combine with other forms of power, 
most notably biopower. This was illustrated through the example of Nazi 
Germany, where biopower and sovereign power combined to murderous effect.100 
Biopower could only exercise the sovereign right to kill when it was justified by 
‘racism’, used as a means to decide which populations must live and which 
populations must die.101 Populations like the Jews could be killed not as political 
adversaries but as biological threats in order to maintain the biological health of 
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the other population. Yet this was by no means the only example. Foucault’s 
sovereignty survives to interact not only with disciplinary power, but also it 
survives to interact with the economic domain and the society of normalisation.102  
 Panu Minkkinen argues that Foucault showed how the identification of 
weaknesses in the classical theory of sovereignty lead to sovereignty taking on a 
guise that allowed it to perform its classical functions whilst at the same time 
overcoming the clashes that result from the incompatibilities between disciplinary, 
normalising and juridical rationalities.103 In a similar manner to Golder and 
Fitzpatrick’s conception of law within Foucault, sovereignty functions as a 
legitimating device. It does so either as an ideological veil juridifying 
governmental practices as well as minimising interference with government 
through, as Minkkinen demonstrates, redefining juridical subjectivity through new 
‘fuzzy’ rights, such as the ‘right’ to be a productive member of society, at the 
expense of traditional political rights.104  
 Thus Foucault did not deny the theory of sovereignty in favour of the analysis 
of power relations in the social body. Instead, Foucault showed the crisis of 
sovereignty in its shift from the power of the monarch to the rationality of 
governmentality – yet this crisis does not challenge sovereignty as a condition of 
the possibility of an order.105  
 
B. Agamben’s Sovereignty  
In attempting to distance his conception of sovereignty from that of Foucault’s, 
Agamben turns to the relationship between constituent and constituted power in 
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order to explain his position of sovereignty. The relationship between these two 
powers has been termed the paradox of constitutionalism.106 Constituent power is 
that power that has the authority to make and found a constitution; constituted 
power is that power found within the institutions that exist under the law and 
constitution formed by the constituting act. The paradox of constitutionalism 
arises as it is not clear whether the constituent power becomes exhausted within 
constituted power after the constituting act occurs, or whether constituent power 
exceeds the original act to remain a check on constituted power, or a source of 
authority other than the law it instituted.  
 It is in answering the paradox of constitutionalism that Agamben disagrees 
explicitly with Antonio Negri. Negri claims that constituent power is separated 
from sovereignty; constituent power is a creative force which is not exhausted in 
what it creates.107 Negri’s constituent power remains as a revolutionary force that 
can be appropriated by the populous against tyrannical or oppressive governance. 
Agamben here does not see constituent power as somehow being surplus to 
sovereign power; constituent power is directly equated with sovereign power.108 
 Such a claim is not without theoretical basis. Sergei Prozorov in his book 
Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty explores Carl Schmitt’s conception of 
sovereignty. Despite sovereignty being pre-eminently important in Agamben’s 
work, tied up as it is with the creation of bare life, the position of the sovereign 
decision is an undeveloped aspect in Agamben’s philosophy. It is as if Schmitt’s 
thesis (or at least a very selective reading of Schmitt) is too uncritically accepted, 
although such an observation may point more towards Agamben’s method rather 
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than a lack of research on his part. Despite this criticism, if we accept that 
Agamben draws much influence from Schmitt then Prozorov’s insights are very 
pertinent to this discussion. 
 Prozorov critically reconstructed Schmitt’s sovereignty, arguing that it has 
been unfairly conflated with Schmitt’s association with the Nazi regime.109 
Prozorov argues that Schmitt’s sovereignty can be viewed as a critique of 
immanentism – Schmitt’s decision on the exception serves as a reminder of the 
transcendence of the political, rupturing the ideal that the social order has no 
outside.110 This is why Schmitt’s sovereign decision had to “emanate from 
nothingness”.111 Schmitt’s sovereignty is therefore a ‘borderline’ concept, and, in 
Prozorov’s terms, it is the irreducible excess of any order that is nonetheless 
indispensible for the order’s emergence – the sovereign decision forms the basis 
of the political order and at the same time is the basis for the current order to be 
transcended. In this sense, sovereignty is directly equated with constituent power. 
 Prozorov also goes on to develop another argument related to sovereignty and 
constituent power, claiming that Foucault’s conception of sovereignty can be 
compared to Schmitt’s in that it also amounts to constituent power. Although 
Prozorov admits that his argument is one which is controversial and many 
Foucauldian scholars would not share,112 it is of interest here as it challenges the 
originality of Agamben’s conception of sovereignty.  
 As noted above, Foucault did concern himself with the historical shift in 
sovereignty from the transcendent monarch to that of government. This historical 
analysis of sovereignty can be seen as an analysis of the constituted order, of 
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sovereign power that is exercised within the institutions of the State. Equally, 
Foucault did note that sovereignty did persist into modernity, and in that way 
Foucauldian sovereignty can be seen as a form of constituent power, namely the 
condition of a possibility of an order, that which transcends specific institutions 
yet does not get subsumed within the new orders it creates. Thus Prozorov finds a 
certain kinship between Foucault and Schmitt. 
 It is at this point that it should be remembered that Agamben aims at 
overcoming biopower. This overcoming would include an overcoming of the 
sovereign decision and the sovereign creation of bare life. Yet looking again at 
Schmitt’s analysis, and, tentatively, those of Prozorov’s interpretation of 
Foucault, Agamben would not simply want to overcome the sovereign decision, 
but also constituent power, which is directly connected to that sovereignty. In this 
way, paradoxically, Agamben’s own conception of sovereignty and constituent 
power needs to be overcome. This position is confused further in Agamben’s 
works due to a radical reimagining of sovereignty, which unfortunately raises 
more questions than answers, especially in relation to Agamben’s overarching 
ontological aim in his work. 
 
C. Agambenian Sovereignty and Potentiality 
In explaining his connections between constituent power and sovereign power, 
Agamben again turns to Aristotle, and specifically his conception of potentiality 
as drawn out in Book Theta of the Metaphysics.113 The structure of potentiality, 
claims Agamben, directly corresponds to the structure of sovereignty. This is not 
potentiality as is commonly understood in the everyday use of the word. 
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Agamben turns back to Aristotle, and explains that for Aristotle there were two 
types of potentiality, only one of which interested him.114 Aristotle identified a 
generic potentiality, one which is meant when we say that a child has the potential 
to know, or that they can potentially become the head of State. According to 
Agamben the potentiality that interested Aristotle is an existing rather than a 
generic potentiality, the potentiality that belongs to someone who has knowledge 
or ability. For example, the poet has the potential to write poems. This existing 
potentiality is contrasted to the generic potentiality of the child. For Aristotle the 
child is potential in that they must suffer an alteration (‘a becoming other’ as 
Agamben puts it) through learning. Whoever already possesses knowledge, like 
the poet, does not need to suffer an alteration, as they are already potential thanks 
to a ‘having’ on the basis of which they can also not bring their knowledge into 
actuality.115 It is this existing potentiality that interests Agamben and forms the 
basis for his analysis of potentiality. 
 For Agamben potentiality is not only a principle by which something is acted 
upon, but also if something has the potential-to-be it must have the potential-not-
to-be at the same time. Potentiality is not simply the potentiality to do this or that 
thing but the potential to not-do, the potential not to pass into actuality.116 The 
existence of potentiality is primarily the existence of non-Being, the presence of 
an absence, or what Agamben terms a ‘faculty’.117 Thus, the originary relation of 
potentiality is its maintaining itself to its own privation, its own non-Being.118 To 
be potential is to be in relation to one’s own incapacity, to be capable of im-
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potentiality.119 Agamben interprets this to mean that a thing is potential when, at 
the moment of its realisation, there is nothing left that is im-potential, nothing 
able not-to-be.120 Potentiality thus fulfils itself by letting itself be - by taking away 
its own potentiality not to be.121 It is this interpretation that exactly matches 
sovereign power for Agamben: 
An act is sovereign when it realizes itself by simply taking away its own 
potentiality not to be, giving itself to itself.122 
 
Most importantly, Agamben attempts to connect this discussion of potentiality to 
Being on the ontological level. In Potentialities, he states that every human power 
is im-potentiality and every human potentiality is always already held in relation 
to its own privation.123 This is both the origin of human power, good and bad, and 
the root of human freedom: 
Other living beings are capable only of their specific potentiality; they can 
only do this or that. But human beings are the animals who are capable of 
their own impotentiality. The greatness of human potentiality is measured 
by the abyss of human impotentiality.124 
 
It is in this formulation that Agamben sees human freedom, properly understood 
neither as the power to do an act, nor the power to refuse to do an act - to be free 
is to be capable of one’s own im-potentiality, to be free for both good and evil.125  
 Human potentiality therefore defines Being; potentiality is what separates 
human being from other beings. This potentiality to be human is fulfilled by 
letting itself, the potentiality to be human, be. Agamben here shows the influence 
of Martin Heidegger, one of his main philosophical influences. In particular 
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Agamben shows the influence of Heidegger’s pronouncements in Being and Time 
that potentiality should have primacy over actuality, as well Heidegger’s 
declaration that Dasein is  defined through potentiality, its own possibility of 
existence.126 For both Agamben and Heidegger, to think of the Being that all 
beings share is to think of the potentiality of Being.127 Such a potentiality moves 
away from defining the human being from any outside referent, as the human 
being already has the potentiality to be within, ready to be fulfilled and pass over 
into actuality.128 The importance of potentiality for the human being is shown 
further in Homo Sacer, where Agamben makes a statement whose brevity belies a 
complex, multilayered conception of human existence: 
Potentiality (in its double appearance as potentiality to and as potentiality 
not to) is that through which Being founds itself sovereignly, which is to 
say, without anything preceding or determining it…other than its own 
ability not to be.129 
 
In one sentence, sovereignty, potentiality and human existence all gain new 
grounding on which to base themselves.  
 Agamben’s discussion of potentiality is at times dense and complicated, but it 
is clear that he intends potentiality in his new meaning to form the basis for his 
resistance against the biopolitical order, and the Being that founds itself 
sovereignly to overcome the dialectic between zoē and bios. This overcoming of 
the dialectic is performed by a ‘politics of pure means’. 
 
D. A Politics of Pure Means 
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The politics of pure means is a politics of pure mediality that leads life to be lived 
in pure immanence. Agambenian resistance has to be grounded other to the 
biopolitical order in order to avoid being subsumed back into the order, and as 
such is grounded in a conception of Being that escapes biopolitical domination. 
Agamben relates this coming politics back to his detailed discussion of 
potentiality, and specifically the relation between potentiality and actuality.  
 Agamben refers back to his observation that potentiality not-to-be is not 
destroyed in the passage from potentiality to actuality but fulfilled. In order to 
preserve the distinction between potentiality and actuality this potentiality-not-to-
be must always be maintained. In potentiality being actualized (zoē being 
actualized into bios) there always already remains the potentiality-not-to-be (bare 
life). Pure potentiality, pure sovereignty grounded in Being takes away the 
potentiality-not-to-be; it consumes the remainder that exists always beyond itself 
when potentiality actualizes and passes into pure immanence or im-potentiality.  
 This im-potentiality shatters the dialectic between act and potentiality, law-
making and law-preserving violence.130 This im-potentiality allows Being to 
found itself sovereignly.131 The human being no longer needs to ground itself in 
an ‘outside’, be that a political order or identity, in order to be fulfilled. Rather, 
Agamben claims that Being as potentiality gives itself to itself, living in its own 
immanence without need of relational existence. This Agamben terms ‘form-of-
life’. Again, Agamben finds inspiration from Heidegger, and particularly 
Heidegger’s ‘factical life’. This is a life in which rule and exception, immanence 
and transcendence, existence and essence are indistinguishable from one another 
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and come together in a Being whose Being at every moment is always already in 
question for itself.132  
 Form-of-life is life lived in its own potentiality of “being thus”,133 meaning 
that the biopolitical law that is integral to bios is overcome and deactivated. This 
does not mean that the law is abandoned, nor does it imply a return to an original 
pre-biopolitical state of nature.134 To deactivate the law is not to return it to an 
original form but to free it from biopolitics meaning that a new usage can be 
found for it. This is only possible if our very way of thinking about sovereignty is 
moved from a form of power towards Being itself, from bios to the thing itself. 
Humanity always has the possibility of redemption beyond biopolitics, even when 
the biopolitical seems to encapsulate every aspect of being human. If legal rights 
do harm the very life that they set out to protect, Agamben reminds us that it is 
time to look again at why this is, and to turn from legal analysis to the analysis of 
life itself, to rethink ontology and try and escape the spectre of bare life. Yet 
Agamben’s analysis is not without its philosophical problems, problems that 
question its very underpinnings and political efficacy.  
 
E. The Sovereign Being 
Primarily, Agamben’s work on sovereignty suffers from a potential contradiction, 
or at least confusion. Agamben refers to a sovereignty which is equated to 
constituent power and a sovereignty which is equated to potentiality which is 
realized by taking away its own potentiality not-to-be. Agamben’s works indicate 
that he is discussing one form of sovereignty that is held in different relations to 
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different concepts.135 However, Agamben in reality refers to two separate 
sovereignties in his work.  
 Agamben equates sovereign power with constituent power, as he does in 
Homo Sacer, which implicitly includes the sovereign power exercised in the 
decision to create bare life.136 As such, the sovereign decision will always be 
constituent power. Yet Agamben goes on in the same passage to state that: 
Only an entirely new conjunction of possibility and reality…will make it 
possible to cut the knot that binds sovereignty to constituting power.137  
 
It is clear from this statement that Agamben’s rethinking of potentiality is an 
ontological attempt to transcend the sovereign decision and bare life. However the 
logical conclusion of the sovereign decision being transcended is the transcending 
of constituent power as well. Agamben is clear in mentioning that his politics to-
come does not do away with constituent power, but rather ‘frees’ it from its 
current bind with sovereign power.138 If this is the case, however, can the current 
sovereign power really be constituent power if it is to be transcended? Or, rather, 
should the equation of sovereignty with constituent power be considered as an 
equation of sovereign power with a constituted power that Agamben wishes to 
transcend? 
 If Agamben is simply talking about one form of sovereignty then sovereign 
power relates to both constituent power and potentiality. The problem with this 
view is that it means that potentiality relates to constituent power, the same 
constituent power that is caught up in the sovereign decision. The logical 
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conclusion of Agamben equating both sovereign power and constituent power and 
vesting it in Being is that the sovereign creation of bare life is not only conducted 
by the State or State organs, but can be undertaken by anyone. Unfortunately this 
line of enquiry is only hinted at by Agamben in his works, as the majority of his 
focus remains on state operations of sovereignty.139 This formulation of 
sovereignty may seem analogous to Judith Butler’s concept of ‘petty 
sovereignty’, the idea that sovereignty under certain situations can be 
appropriated by non-state actors to use for their own ends, this would be a 
misunderstanding. Butler’s petty sovereignty still presupposes a definite centre or 
source for sovereign power which then delegates that sovereignty out to others.140 
 If this is correct, then Being cannot escape the sovereign decision creating 
bare life, as Being is caught up in the creation of bare life, which is surely not 
what Agamben intended. Rather, the sovereignty of constituent power and the 
sovereignty of potentiality could be considered as separate sovereignties; 
Agamben does state that “sovereignty is always double”.141 Agambenian 
sovereignty has no ‘centre’ or source, nor is it dispersed throughout the social 
body, acting upon Being itself. Sovereignty is potentiality, and appropriately it 
holds the potential for a Being that is beyond biopolitics and bare life. Therefore 
only Being that grounds itself sovereignly in relation to its own potentiality not to 
be is capable of forming the politics to-come that overcomes the figure of bare 
life. 
 Whilst this is one possible reading of Agamben, matters are further confused 
when Agamben seeks to think a “constitution of potentiality” entirely freed from 
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sovereignty and indeed any relation to Being, which is in fact the thinking of 
ontology beyond any form of relation.142 This is a puzzling section of writing, 
seeming as it does to contradict his works both on potentiality and undermining 
Agamben’s aim to ground Being ontologically in potentiality. This grounding, 
being linked to sovereignty, is the very relationality that Agamben is trying to 
move away from. Agamben sets up an ontological task that appears beyond even 
his thinking.  
 Nevertheless, Agamben’s conception of potentiality as sovereignty moves 
sovereign power far beyond traditional conceptions of sovereignty as a single 
source for law, power and self-knowledge, the autocephalous state as Minkkinen 
phrases it.143 Sovereignty instead becomes the key to defining Being itself, 
radically dislocated from traditional hierarchies and structures of law and political 
governance.  
 With this in mind, Agamben’s contention that the sovereign and bare life 
exist in a dichotomous topographical relationship – the sovereign is excluded 
from the political order by means of his inclusion within it, and bare life is 
included within the order only by means of its exclusion from it – can be looked 
at again. It is clear that Agamben sees the sovereign as an actualized figure, as he 
does bare life. To make matters even more complex, Agamben offers yet another 
definition of the relation between Being and the sovereign: 
Being, as potentiality, suspends itself, maintaining itself in a relationship 
of ban (or abandonment) with itself to realize itself as absolute actuality 
(which thus presupposes nothing other than its own potentiality). At the 
limit, pure potentiality and pure actuality are indistinguishable, and the 
sovereign is precisely this zone of indistinction.144 
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What this passage suggests is that what distinguishes Being from bare life and in 
turn the sovereign is sovereignty’s potentiality. If sovereignty is that potentiality 
that Being uses to found itself then bare life is Being which does not possess this 
sovereignty, that potentiality and potentiality not-to-be Agamben declared was 
intrinsic to the human being.145 In this way, bare life is not simply deprived of just 
legal rights but the im-potentiality that allows human beings to be capable of 
greatness as well. Such a position destabilizes all concepts of political identity, as 
bare life is not concerned with political identity but with the potentiality of Being 
itself.  
 In addition to these points, it may be questionable whether Agamben’s 
ontology is actually ontological in nature, although this point requires an in-depth 
analysis that cannot be undertaken here. Whilst Agamben refers back to Being, 
for Heidegger Agamben’s analysis may well be considered ontic in nature. 
Heidegger’s concepts of freedom and Being are connected, as Heidegger defines 
freedom as the possibility in the disclosure of Being.146 Yet for Heidegger Being 
can never be defined or captured, as Being always withdraws, remaining partially 
concealed; any attempt to seek out the essence of Being is already a distortion of 
Being, as Being is always more than can be made of it.147 The form-of-life 
Agamben posits cannot be truly ontological if it amounts to an attempt to 
essentialize Being, or reduce it in anyway to a form of potentiality.  
 Unfortunately, and possibly because the Homo Sacer project is incomplete, 
the concept of the form-of-life has not been fully developed in Agamben’s work, 
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but it offers tantalising starting points for further inquiries into his works. What 
may be a larger problem for Agamben’s philosophy are the parallels that can be 
drawn between Agamben’s Being and Foucault’s own transcendent subjectivity, 
problems primarily due to Agamben’s explicit attempt to move beyond Foucault’s 
thought.  
 
F. Foucault’s Critical Ontology 
The position of ontology within Michel Foucault’s work is certainly a debatable 
one. Another debatable point is Foucault’s status as a philosopher. For example, 
Gary Gutting views Foucault primarily as a historian, with his books being 
superficially classifiable as histories.148 Gutting’s position is controversial, not 
being shared by many scholars, including Beatrice Han,149 and also Foucault 
himself.150 As well as this, Foucault did make several claims for historical 
ontologies within his various works relating to how the human being is 
constituted as a subject by power relations.151 This site of historical ontology, 
namely the plane of historically specific forms of truth, power and subjectivity 
has been termed by Prozorov as a ‘diagram’.152 It is in this diagram that the 
subject is produced by power.153 
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 A possible ground for Foucauldian ontology has been found in Foucault’s 
conception of freedom.154 Prozorov in particular traces the development of a 
Foucauldian subject whose ontological freedom is transgressive of any 
constituted form of order. This can be read in conjunction with the attempt by 
Foucault to theorise a new body that escapes the powers of capture and 
recuperation of a state system, and also with the observation that resistance 
precedes power. Prozorov argues that Foucauldian freedom is ontologically prior 
to the concept of the diagram, but ontically accessible only in relation to its 
resistance to the diagram.155 Thus freedom is constituent of every individual, yet 
this freedom can only be seen in the subject’s resistance to the power relations 
existing within the diagram. Foucauldian freedom always resists power and 
reaches beyond power, attempting to rupture the immanent social order and 
provide room for concrete political action. As Foucault stated in ‘What Is 
Enlightenment?’: 
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a 
theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the 
same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.156 
 
It is important to note the similarities between Foucault’s transcendent subject 
and Agamben’s immanent Being of im-potentiality. Both figures aim to go 
beyond the current political order and institute a new politics which has the free 
human being at its heart. In this sense, therefore, Agamben is on dangerous 
philosophical ground. After claiming that Foucault’s grounding resistance in the 
body will always be futile, Agamben is left open to a potential criticism that he 
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has backed himself into a political and philosophical cul-de-sac, foreclosing 
potential avenues of resistance and offering a solution which may well be 
inadequate to the task at hand.  
 
G. Agamben and Law 
Where does this leave Agambenian thought in relation to the law? It is suggested 
that despite the criticisms noted above, Agamben does outline some 
fundamentally important issues that legal scholars need to pay attention to, 
primarily relating to the juridification of thought.157 Murray and Zartaloudis 
explain the process of the juridification of thought as when the model of thought 
itself becomes judgment and a legal understanding of responsibility.158 Law has 
thus permeated through all levels of being; meaning that life today is a life lived 
through the law. Murray and Zartaloudis are also correct in stating that the 
impossibility of thinking life as separate from law seems to be demonstrated by 
the difficulty for lawyers and legal theorists to appreciate the implications of 
Agamben’s thought without feeling threatened by it.159  
 Perhaps Agamben’s greatest insight is to note that law-making occurs within 
an apparatus of the state of exception which has permeated, and attempts to 
regulate and control all areas of life in general.160 In this sense, Agamben is 
correct in trying to rethink the law on the ontological level, calling into question 
the liberal ideal of human rights, and questioning the transcendence of the human 
implied in those legal, especially when Agamben points out that those very legal 
rights necessitate the production of a bare life.  
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V. Conclusion 
This article has made three arguments. Firstly, Giorgio Agamben’s ‘correction’ of 
Michel Foucault’s biopower is based upon an implicit acceptance of the 
Hunt/Wickham expulsion thesis. This can be seen as an attempt by Agamben to 
generate distance between his and Foucault’s respective formulations of biopower 
and biopolitics. Secondly, this article has gone on to consider the similarities 
between Agamben’s conception of law and an immanent juridical order and the 
post-structuralist interpretations of Foucault’s writings on law given by Peter 
Fitzpatrick and Ben Golder.  
 Finally, this article has examined Agamben’s attempt to rethink ontology, 
arguing that despite its attempts, it is similar in its implications to Foucault’s own 
critical ontology. That being said, there is a lot to admire in Agamben’s work, 
specifically his conceptions of the exception and sovereignty, which ask us to 
question again the very connection between law and life itself. Thus while 
Agamben may not yet have succeeded in his ambitious aims to radically depart 
from Foucault, his work gives us many areas and ideas that will enrich legal and 
philosophical thought. 
 
